



**OVERT ACCEPTANCE:
CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE IN COVERT OPERATIVES**

CHIP MICHAEL BUCKLEY

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

The Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
APPLIED INTELLIGENCE

RIDGE SCHOOL FOR INTELLIGENCE STUDIES
AND INFORMATION SCIENCE
MERCYHURST UNIVERSITY
ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA
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DEDICATION

To my father.

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I would like to acknowledge a number of important individuals who have provided an extraordinary amount of support throughout this process. The faculty at Mercyhurst University, particularly Professor Stephen Zidek, provided invaluable guidance when researching and developing this thesis. My friends and classmates also volunteered important ideas and guidance throughout this time. Lastly, my family's support, patience, and persistent inquiries regarding my progress cannot be overlooked.

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Overt Acceptance:

Cultural Intelligence in Covert Operatives

A Critical Examination

By

Chip Michael Buckley

Master of Science in Applied Intelligence

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Professor S. C. Zidek, Chair

In the post-9/11 national security landscape, both former President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama have increasingly relied upon covert action to support policy. This study seeks to explain critical characteristics of successful covert action operations, specifically through covert operatives' 'cultural intelligence' knowledge and expertise. The author sought to explain the symbiotic relationship between covert action and 'cultural intelligence' through a thorough examination of a single case study focusing on Operation JAWBREAKER because this operation represents the type of covert operations that characterizes this period of time. The JAWBREAKER team leaders' 'cultural intelligence' levels were analyzed using a cultural intelligence scale in order to determine how their leading 'cultural intelligence' knowledge reflected their operational performance during Operation JAWBREAKER. Indeed, the author found that there is a positive correlation between high 'cultural intelligence' levels and covert operational success.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|------|---|
| AOR | Area of Responsibility |
| BEH | Behavioral Cultural Intelligence Dimension |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CJDM | Cultural Judgment and Decision Making |
| COG | Cognitive Cultural Intelligence Dimension |
| CQ | Cultural Intelligence |
| CQS | Cultural Intelligence Survey |
| IC | Intelligence Community |
| MC | Metacognitive Cultural Intelligence Dimension |
| MOT | Motivational Cultural Intelligence Dimension |

INTRODUCTION

Introduction to Problem

In a complex and dynamic geopolitical stage, the United States possesses the means to carry out covert operations in support of its national security interests. Specifically in the post-9/11 national security landscape, both former President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama have increasingly relied upon covert action to support policy. Due to the fact that covert operations by their very nature occur on foreign soil, a covert operative must possess the cultural intelligence necessary to properly interact, foster cooperation, and build a trusting relationship with the host nation's¹ populous.

Following September 11, 2001, the United States' citizenry and the Bush Administration were understandably eager to strike back at the parties responsible for the attacks on American soil. The U.S. government immediately attributed these attacks to Usama bin Laden, his terrorist organization al Qaeda, and the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which provided them sanctuary. To directly attack those enemy safe havens, Washington approved and implemented the quickly formulated and operational plans of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Operation JAWBREAKER. Operation JAWBREAKER was a coordinated campaign orchestrated by the United States' CIA and primarily carried out by the Afghan Northern Alliance against the ruling Taliban and their al Qaeda allies in Afghanistan.

¹ The author defines *host nation* as a foreign state in which the United States deploys its personnel.

The speed and extent of JAWBREAKER's operational success astounded many people. Former CIA Counter Terrorism Center Director Cofer Black dubbed the operation as the CIA's "finest hour" (Berntsen, 2005). Initiated on 26 September 2001, Operation JAWBREAKER resulted in the fall of Kabul by mid-November 2001, signifying the loss of Taliban control in northern Afghanistan. Two paramilitary officers led the JAWBREAKER campaign that ousted the Taliban in the aftermath of September 11th. Gary Schroen and Gary Berntsen were extraordinarily effective paramilitary officers, utilizing their high cultural intelligence (CQ) in working alongside Afghan allies for the duration of the operation.

Background of the Problem

In the past decade and a half, researchers have greatly expanded the literature on CQ, much of which focuses on CQ as part of an individual's intellectual capacity. Literature on cultural intelligence does not, however, explain the enormous effect it has on covert action operations, specifically when evaluated within the context of a covert operative. Furthermore, the literature regarding covert action operations fails to adequately demonstrate the significance of this relationship.

With covert action's increasingly important role as a tool of American foreign policy, it is critical to understand the role of cultural intelligence as it pertains to covert operatives. Therefore, this scholarly work will enrich the nascent body of literature. Covert operatives should possess high CQ, as high CQ correlates with offer increased chances of success; success being defined as the completion of previously outlined operational objectives. Without literature that acknowledges the most important cultural intelligence dimensions as they pertain to covert action, however, it is impossible to quantify the cultural intelligence qualifications of covert operatives.

Theoretical Framework

Extant literature points to a multi-locus construct of cultural intelligence (Sternberg, 1986). Further research has expanded this ‘loci intelligence theory’ through the distinction of four dimensions of CQ: metacognition, cognition, motivation, and behavior (Earley & Ang, 2003).

- *Metacognitive CQ* refers to the process of individuals to understand and use knowledge. According to Ang et al. (2007), individuals with high metacognitive CQ are “consciously aware of others’ cultural preferences before and during interactions,” (p. 338).
- *Cognitive CQ* focuses on knowledge of social norms within a given context. Specifically, this expertise is driven from education and personal experiences (Ang et al., 2007).
- *Motivational CQ* reflects an intrinsic interest in learning about and interacting within different cultures (Ang et al., 2007).
- *Behavioral CQ* deals with an individual’s capability to interact in appropriate ways specific to the culture he is interacting in. This includes verbal and nonverbal forms of communication (Ang et al., 2007).

Together, some social scientists argue that these different cultural intelligence dimensions form a comprehensive understanding of cultural intelligence at the psychological level (Ng, et al., 2012). Furthermore, Ang et al. (2007) outlined a cultural intelligence scale (CQS) to evaluate the cultural intelligence competencies of individuals. Ang et al. showed that these four CQ divisions have a differential relationship and play equally important roles in the CQ makeup of an individual. This study has applied the CQS to both Schroen in Berntsen in an effort to evaluate each individual’s capacity of each CQ dimension.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to understand the role that different cultural intelligence dimensions play in the successful execution of covert action operations,

specifically through the context of covert operatives themselves. Operation JAWBREAKER represented an irrefutable successful paramilitary operation implemented by two highly regarded CIA paramilitary operatives, Gary Schroen and Gary Berntsen. Yet, evaluating Schroen and Berntsen's actions during the JAWBREAKER operation as they correspond with the Ang et al.'s CQS will offer a more complete profile of "successful" covert operatives, measured in terms of the completion of predetermined operational goals. Further, evaluating Schroen and Berntsen's overall mission and completed objectives of Operation JAWBREAKER, will provide overarching support to the relationship between these two subjects.

Research Questions

It is generally accepted that intricate cultural understanding of a given area of responsibility (AOR) is an obvious factor of successful paramilitary operations. With this in mind, this study will determine which CQ dimensions Early & Ang (2007) outlined are most predictive of success when evaluating paramilitary operatives.

R1: What cultural intelligence dimensions of CIA paramilitary operatives are most predictive of success in their given paramilitary operations?

Definitions of Terms

The National Security Act of 1947 defines covert action as *an action or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly*. However, this study slightly alters the Joint Chiefs' of Staff (2014) definition of paramilitary forces in order to define paramilitary operations as *operations carried out by forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission*.

Remaining consistent with the previously mentioned theoretical framework, the author defers to Early & Ang (2003) while defining cultural intelligence as *an individual's capability to function and manage effectively in culturally diverse settings* (p. 59).

Nature of the Study

This study will be qualitative in nature due to its case-study approach and the fact that extant literature on the theories being evaluated is almost exclusively qualitative in nature. Because this study seeks to analyze the decision making and personalities of individuals throughout a specific event, placing an emphasis on the qualitative nature of this study is both more applicable and appropriate. Moreover, due to the fact that this study is combining two previously independent research fields in form of cultural intelligence and covert action, utilizing a qualitative case study will provide a foundation from which a more advanced and structured research study could be formulated (Levy, 2008).

By conducting a qualitative descriptive case study of this research in analyzing the cultural intelligence of the Operation JAWBREAKER team leaders, a better understanding of the nature and scope of the relationship between the two bodies of literature will certainly emerge. More specifically, this relationship will demonstrate which cultural intelligence capacities are most predictive of success in paramilitary operations.

Significance of the Study

This study is significant for a number of reasons. First, since the September 11th terrorist attacks, Presidents Bush and Obama have set the precedent for presidents to rely heavily upon covert action, particularly paramilitary operations, as an irregular

instrument to support American foreign policy. With paramilitary operations used as a means of combating asymmetric warfare such as counterinsurgencies and counter-terrorism campaigns, it is critical to tailor operations in the most favorable way possible. One of the most critical ways of doing so is putting paramilitary operatives who possess high 'cultural intelligence' in theater. However, without applying recent cultural intelligence research to the screening and selection processes of paramilitary operatives, it is impossible to properly conduct these processes. By evaluating the cultural intelligence of two of the most successful American paramilitary operatives in the past fifteen years in the context of the most highly regarded paramilitary operation in recent memory, this study will provide a critical real-world application to the literature.

Assumptions and Limitations

This study rests on three key assumptions, addressed in order of strength. The first assumption is that covert paramilitary operatives are different in a number of ways from conventional military forces as well as special operations forces. This is due to not only the very nature of each other's mission, but also the parameters that each group must navigate around while in theater. It is generally understood that covert operations, specifically paramilitary operations, are much more decentralized than conventional military operations. This is in part due to the fact that the CIA reports directly to the President of the United States. With this in mind, there is much less bureaucracy than that of Department of Defense operations, for instance. Furthermore, with this relationship and chain of command in mind, the political, financial, and operational support is even more streamlined than Defense Department operations. The second key assumption put forth by the author is that future covert operations will be similar to Operation JAWBREAKER in the form of resource allocation and political support. This assumption

is based upon the aforementioned increased reliance of Presidents Bush and Obama in covert operations. The third assumption the author is making is that positive and successful interactions between individuals from other cultures—to include covert operations—are inherently dependent on high and functioning cultural intelligence levels by both parties.

A number of limitations exist regarding the subject matter at hand. Due to the secret nature of covert action operations, there is limited literature regarding Operation JAWBREAKER and covert operations within Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001. Operation JAWBREAKER is unique in the fact that multiple memoirs and sources have been written on it in the form of both primary and secondary sources. Furthermore, these documents highlight the identities of the covert operatives involved in the operation. It is certain that other covert operatives and operations have taken place since September 2001 but remain classified. With this in mind, most literature comes from first-hand accounts through memoirs of operatives involved in the JAWBREAKER campaign, though it is important to keep in mind that the operatives' respective organization, the CIA, has vetted these primary sources prior to publishing. Due to this reliance on primary sources and memoirs while conducting an evaluation on the operatives' CQ, this research is likely to encounter bias. However, due to the fact that recent history has seen the JAWBREAKER campaign as a resounding success, the author views these biases as negligible. A second limitation is the author's efforts to quantify the operative's cultural intelligence levels through Ang et al.'s CQS. This is a limitation due to the fact that the author's opinions are indisputably subjective, regardless of efforts to resist bias. The inherently subjective nature of these ratings limits the study's accuracy.

The author has chosen a narrow time frame for this research study. While the JAWBREAKER campaign has no universally recognized time frame, the scope of this study is 26 September to 14 November 2001. The author chose these dates due to the fact that they mark the insertion of the JAWBREAKER team and the fall of the Afghan capital of Kabul, an operational success and completion of a critical objective. The fall of Kabul was a significant in that it meant, for all intents and purposes, the collapse of enemy resistance in Northern Afghanistan in the form of a formal Taliban government (Crumpton, 2012). Furthermore, later dates mark an increasingly large relative presence of special operations forces in theater. While there was a military operations force presence during this study's designated time frame, the centerpiece of this time frame focuses on the CIA's paramilitary teams due to the fact that the primary fighting forces involved in overthrowing the Taliban were the Northern Alliance and its allies, as coordinated by the CIA.

Organization of the Study

The subsequent chapters will progressively build on the content of this chapter. Chapter two will further evaluate the theoretical framework of both CQ and covert action. Delving into existing academic research on these subject matters, the author will paint a more comprehensive and clearer picture of the theory being applied to this study. Chapter two will also serve as a review of the methodological literature to explain the nature of the study more in-depth. As a whole, the second chapter will help the reader better understand cultural intelligence capacities and covert action—specifically paramilitary operations—and the theoretical ties between them.

Chapter three presents a methodological overview of the study. In this chapter the research design will be expanded and include the explanation of the selection of the

JAWBREAKER case study for the purposes of this thesis. The following chapter will discuss the results of this study. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the findings of the study and the implications of those findings, while presenting suggestions for further research.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction to the Literature Review

This chapter will introduce the relevant literature used throughout this research. The research's theoretical framework will first be introduced as cultural intelligence as a multi-loci construct. An emerging body of literature, cultural intelligence as a multi-loci construct portrays cultural intelligence as a four-pronged intellectual concept. The chapter will continue on by reviewing the bodies of literature regarding cultural intelligence as a whole, as well as covert action. Lastly, the methodological literature will be introduced prior to Chapter three.

Theoretical Framework: Cultural Intelligence As a Multi-Loci Construct

The broad theoretical framework utilized in assessing the role of cultural intelligence in covert action operations presents intelligence as neither “wholly within the individual nor wholly within the environment, but rather with the interaction between the two. Essentially, how does the individual function...within various environmental milieu?” (Sternberg, 1986, p. 8). Earley and Ang subscribed to this conceptual framework when they presented intelligence as a wider concept rather than the conventional school of thought that focuses exclusively on cognitive ability. They argued that evaluating intelligence exclusively within the scope of cognition ignores motivational mental functioning, which is necessary to engage in cognitive processes (Earley & Ang, 2003). Furthermore, the researchers argued that intelligence behavior is more than simply logical reasoning or verbal ability (Earley & Ang, 2003, p. 57).

Because of these and other factors, Earley and Ang (2003) conceptualized cultural intelligence as “a concept where the locus of intelligence is positioned at the interaction

between the individual and the environment” (p. 58). This theoretical framework builds upon Sternberg’s (1986) notion that there three main loci of intelligence—intelligence within the individual, the environment, and within the relationship between the two. Taking this construct one step further, Earley and Ang (2003) pointed to a four-pronged focus of cultural intelligence. These four facets of cultural intelligence are metacognitive CQ, cognitive CQ, motivational CQ, and behavioral CQ. This four-pronged approach to cultural intelligence, as outlined by Earley and Ang, reflects an individual’s acclimatization to an alien cultural as well as their ability to “deal effectively with the other person with whom the person does not share a common cultural background and understanding” (p. 12). With this in mind, CQ requires an individual to observe, understand, possess motivation to act/interact, and implement action within a given environment (Earley & Ang, 2003). Earley and Ang’s conceptualization of CQ as a multidimensional concept means that these four levels are equally important and together make up the construct of CQ itself (Ng et al., 2012).

Review of Research Literature

Cultural Intelligence

Aside from the aforementioned definition of cultural intelligence as an individual’s capability to function and manage effectively in culturally diverse settings (Earley & Ang, 2003), cultural intelligence is theoretically precise to the degree that there is clarity on what it is (metacognition/cognition, motivation, behavior) and what it is not (Ng et al., 2012). A number of preexisting personal characteristics reflect a potentially high level of cultural intelligence within an individual. These include “openness to experience,” an individual’s predisposition to be creative, their conscientiousness, as well as their international experience (Oolders et al., 2008; Ng et al., 2012).

Metacognition/Cognition. Metacognitive CQ refers to the process of individuals to acquire and understand knowledge and can be carried over to evaluate the procedures of an individual acquiring a new cultural perspective (Ang et al., 2007; Earley & Ang, 2003). It allows individuals to be aware of their own mental functions and abilities as well as knowing one's own self-conceptions (Earley & Ang, 2003). In the context of cultural intelligence, high metacognition enables individuals to be aware of other's cultural preferences and norms before and during interactions (Ang et al., 2007). Earley and Ang (2003) argued in their literature that a number of factors play into metacognitive CQ. These include a heightened sense of self-awareness and cognitive flexibility to the degree that individuals can reshape and adapt their self-conceptions. More specifically, Earley and Ang (2003) pointed to inductive and analogical reasoning skills as paramount to having high metacognitive CQ. If used properly, Earley and Ang (2003) argued that these skills allow one to think beyond their pre-existing self-conceptions and to better understand the alien culture that surrounds them. Two subsets of metacognition are metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experience (Early & Ang, 2003). Metacognitive knowledge is acquired knowledge, or learned metacognitive traits. Metacognitive experience, similarly, deals with how an individual learned and deals with certain situations in a way that effect their future interactions in related situations (Early & Ang, 2003). In the context of cultural intelligence and covert operatives, both metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experience provide insight to an operatives own perceptions and thoughts when in a culturally diverse environment. This self-awareness can be critical to an operative because knowing himself provides a better

chance for success when oftentimes interacting with strangers from different cultural backgrounds.

Motivation. Generally, literature has neglected motivation as a dimension of intelligence. However, Earley and Ang asserted that motivation is just as important to intelligence as the cognitive process in that it refers to the willingness of an individual engage others in an unfamiliar setting due to the fact that it plays a substantial role in both the quality and extent of one's cognitive efforts (2003; Sternberg, 1986).

Specifically, Earley and Ang made the point that motivational CQ "reflects a person's ability to generate appropriate behaviors in a new cultural setting" (2003, p. 10). Consider that knowledge and complete understanding of an unfamiliar culture is useless if the motivation to assimilate and adapt in order to ensure an effective experience is nonexistent.

Motivational theorists acknowledge two focuses of motivation within an individual. These are the extent of motivation and the direction of said motivation (Sternberg, 1986). For example, while human beings have a natural affection for learning, different individuals have varying levels of motivation to learn different subject matters. Moreover, one's motivation to learn can vary drastically depending on the utilized learning technique (Sternberg, 1986). Within the context of cultural intelligence and covert action, operatives' must have the motivation to engage other individuals from unfamiliar and oftentimes drastically different cultures. Within the scope of covert operations for the purposes of national security, this motivation is likely to come from national pride, patriotism, or even self-preservation if an operative were to find himself in a dangerous situation.

Behavior. Behavioral intelligence is directed explicitly towards an individual's actions, as the name might suggest, and deals with putting the other cultural dimensions to use (Sternberg, 1986). "Individuals who are able to identify, attend to, and control the impressions they make on others via the production of their social behaviors [are] able to adapt or acculturate more effectively" (Earley & Ang, 2003, p. 181). Because this pattern of behavior displays cultural consistency, Earley and Ang (2003) argued that individuals of the host culture are more accepting of individuals with high behavioral CQ.

One specific behavioral domain is critical in the context of cultural intelligence: the social domain. This domain provides insight on a person's use of intelligence in the establishing relationships with others, as well as building a more firm understanding of oneself. Scholars have argued that getting to know oneself may very well help that individual understand others from unfamiliar cultures, and vice versa (Sternberg, 1986).

Each facet of the multi-loci construct of CQ can be used to explain effective working relationships between individuals from different cultures, to include cultural norms for American paramilitary operatives themselves. Rockstuhl and Ng (2008), for example, found that individuals from different cultures were more likely to establish a foundation of trust between one another if one individual had higher metacognitive/cognitive CQ than the partner, while the other individual possessed a higher behavioral CQ. This demonstrates a complementary relationship between the different CQ dimensions when applied between two individuals from separate cultures. Furthermore, Ang et al. (2007) found that high metacognitive and behavioral CQ enable an individual to better understand and act upon cultural norms, therefore acting as a predictive tool for success in cross-cultural experiences.

Any type of international experience that exposes individuals to different cultural norms than their own has been highlighted as a predictive measurement of all four dimensions outlined by Earley and Ang, though disputes within the literature exist. Some researchers have found international experience predictive of metacognitive and motivational CQ (Shannon & Begley, 2008) while others for example, have attributed international experience only to cognitive intelligence (Tay et al., 2008). The type of international experience gained is critical to CQ, of course. Individuals with a higher rate of interaction with people from other cultures are likely to have a further developed CQ than those who do not (Ng et al., 2012).

Ang et al. (2007) found during their empirical research on CQ that their 20 question CQS was both valid and reliable as an effective cultural intelligence evaluation method. The researchers utilized their CQS in a three-part experiment with the following findings:

- Metacognitive CQ and cognitive CQ related positively to cultural judgment and decision-making (CJDM)² effectiveness.
- Metacognitive CQ and behavioral CQ related positively to task performance within cross-cultural interactions.
- Motivational CQ and behavioral CQ related positively to cultural adaption.
- Cognitive CQ and motivational CQ did not relate positively to task performance within cross-cultural interactions.

The results of this research go far beyond recognizing the CQS as a valid and reliable CQ methodology capable of being applied across various samples, times, and countries (Ang et al., 2007). The findings demonstrate the CQ has the potential to predict three key aspects of productive cross-cultural interaction: CJDM, cultural adaption, task

² CJDM refers to a human's ability to make decisions based on appropriate cultural values within a given situation (Ang et al., 2007).

performance (Ang et al., 2007). With high cultural intelligence levels in the aforementioned dimensions of metacognition/cognition, motivation, and behavior, a profile of a covert operative likely to be successful in his mission is likely to appear. The cultural intelligence factors utilized in this study encompass the most critical aspect of an individual's effectiveness of working in a culturally diverse setting. Subsequently, the positive levels of these dimensions are critical to effective covert operatives.

Covert Action

Referred to by some within the intelligence community as the “third option,” covert action is an important form of influence available to the President of the United States, falling somewhere between diplomacy and a declaration of war (Johnson, 2012). Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger alluded to the importance of covert action when he described how the United States “need[s] an intelligence community that, in certain complicated situations, can defend the American national interest in the grey areas where military operations are not suitable and diplomacy cannot operate” (Johnson, 2012,

| Covert Action | Clandestine Operations |
|--|---|
| Plausible Deniability | Tactical Secrecy |
| Congressional Intelligence Committees Notified | Normally Conducted by Uniformed Military Forces |

| | |
|---|--|
| Secrecy of Sponsor | No Congressional Notification or Approval Required |
| Not Normally Conducted by Uniformed Military Forces | |

p. 79). The National Security Act of 1947 defines covert action as an action or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will

not be apparent or acknowledged publically. This definition differentiates covert action from clandestine operations in that the latter does not leave any room for plausible deniability, but rather maintains an element of complete secrecy regarding the operatives involved (Nutter, 2000). Kibbe (2007) described a more nuanced difference between the two by pointing out that “clandestine refers to the tactical secrecy of the operation itself, covert refers to the secrecy of its sponsor” (p. 57).

In order to be legally implemented within the United States, explicit presidential approval must be granted and both the House and Senate intelligence oversight committees must monitor a covert action operation in order to ensure congressional oversight (Johnson, 2012). Furthermore, intelligence services typically carry out covert operations due to the secret nature of said operations; the operation’s reliance on intelligence; and the need of the operations to utilize managed and trusted foreign agents (Crumpton, 2012). In the United States, covert action has primarily fallen under the realm of the Central Intelligence Agency, though the Department of Defense has undertaken a larger role in covert action operations in recent years through special operations forces (Kibbe, 2007).

Types of Covert Action Operations

There are four primary forms of covert action: propaganda efforts, political action, economic warfare, and paramilitary action (Johnson, 2012).

Propaganda. Propaganda efforts are simply the act of a state to influence the people of a foreign nation to engage in a particular action or take a particular stance regarding an issue through inundating them with information (Nutter, 2000).

Political action. Political action refers to a government's attempt to influence the political structure, system, or political outcomes within a foreign country. Examples of political covert action can include election rigging and the propping up of favorable political candidates (Isenberg, 1989).

Economic action. Economic covert action can be described as a government's attempt to alter the economic system or stability of a foreign entity. This could include industrial or financial espionage as well as financial assistance to favorable foreign groups or individuals (Isenberg, 1989). Economic covert action can also be carried out through physical sabotage, production of counterfeit currency, and to an increasing degree cyber attacks on designated financial systems (Nutter, 2000).

Paramilitary operations. Within this scope of this document, paramilitary operations take center stage. According to Roy Godson (2003), paramilitary action can be described as "unacknowledged use of force, or assistance to those perpetrating or resisting the use of force" (p. 185). Within the confines of this definition, paramilitary action fits the criteria of covert action influencing foreign entities in a plausibly deniable way. A number of different types of paramilitary operations exist. Most notably, people tend to think of coup d'état and guerilla movements when considering paramilitary

action. However, operations such as assassination³ and rendition are also types of paramilitary operations. What differentiates paramilitary action from the other types of covert action means, however, is the extent of which force is used—whether direct or indirect.

The Central Intelligence Agency's Special Activities Division (SAD) is the US government's primary paramilitary operations force (Crumpton, 2012). As it will be shown, the President and the Director of the CIA (DCI) tasked the SAD with executing Operation JAWBREAKER in Afghanistan immediately following 9/11 and represents a textbook example of a successful paramilitary covert action operation.

Players

Paramilitary teams are comprised of individuals with unique personalities, skills, experiences, and expertise that transcend both traditional military culture and the analytical side of the intelligence community. These covert action specialists vary by the types of covert action operations they engage in, but share some unique abilities.

Paramilitary operatives tend not to exhibit the traditional military values of discipline and obedience. Rather, their positions necessitate a strong ability to develop ideas and apply them to a host of different situations and engagements throughout the course of their careers. Often times, particularly in the post-9/11 American national security environment, covert action operatives receive ambiguous tasks and need to maintain the flexibility and improvisation necessary to ensure mission completion. When in the operational environment, it is necessary for paramilitary teams to act as a delicate mix of

³ Executive Order 12333, signed by President Gerald Ford in 1981, prohibits US persons from engaging in or conspiring to attempt an assassination.

military leaders and diplomats in an effort to influence and bring about a desired political-end state through some degree of military involvement (Godson, 2003). Other factors that help make a successful covert action operative include an unparalleled devotion to the mission at hand, with a keen sense of creativity, initiative, and ability to both spot and exploit even the slightest opportunity (Godson, 2003).

The aforementioned abilities characterize potential effective covert operatives. However, there is a tradecraft to covert action operations, regardless of the type of covert action the individual is engaged in. Perhaps most important is the cultural knowledge and understanding of a given AOR and the individuals and groups who inhabit it (Godson, 2003). If the ultimate goal of covert action is to influence the events, thoughts, or actions of foreign entities, then it is unreasonable to expect any sort of effective covert action operation to come at the hands of an uneducated or ignorant operative. Because of this, experience abroad, foreign language skills, and a deep understanding of cultural intricacies in given areas are exceptionally beneficial to covert action operatives.

Factors of Success

To be successful, covert action must support policy. However, it is important to understand that covert action cannot be relied upon as a *replacement* of policy. Rather, covert action needs to be a tool used to support foreign policy objectives (Crumpton, 2012). As part of an effective foreign policy strategy, covert action should ideally be supported with all other facets of this international vision—to include diplomatic, military, and economic policies (Godson, 2003). Similarly, when employed without these supporting forces, covert action is often counterproductive and can carry disastrous consequences (Godson, 2003). The US has a history of relying on covert action in desperate times (Crumpton, 2012).

Regardless of the type of covert action a state carries out, success is directly reliant to some degree on a network of contacts within the AOR (Godson, 2003). Whether these assets are in the form of discrete allies or intelligence providers—likely both—they play an irreplaceable part in an effective covert action operation. There is almost certainly a mutually beneficial relationship between the covert operator and his asset (Godson, 2003). It is paramount for covert operatives, particularly paramilitary operatives, to utilize willing partners when carrying out their missions (Crumpton, 2012). Johnson (2012) pointed out that the more allies a paramilitary team has at its disposal, the better positioned the operation is for success.

Just as covert action is an instrument of policy, paramilitary operations need to be employed with the full support of necessary resources available. For instance, a small group of paramilitary officers and their tribal allies cannot effectively accomplish a large-scale mission; much less take control of a country without the logistical, communications, and tactical support of the United States government (Crumpton, 2012). It is important to note, however, that these resources are not always utilized to the maximum extent—if that were the case then the covert nature of the operation would be blown. Rather, the support element needs to be provided as necessary with the most minimal footprint possible in order to ensure mission success while maintaining a discrete presence within the AOR.

Review of the Methodological Literature

Relevant methodological literature points to a descriptive cross-sectional research design, specifically an illustrative case-study approach for the purposes of this study. Through this research design, this study will provide a foundation from which a more

advanced and structured research study could be formulated in the fields of covert action and cultural intelligence (Levy, 2008). Gerring, Levy, and Trochim offer the most prominent support for this methodological approach. The case study approach will provide support to the theoretical framework being utilized, as well as to build on existent literature on the subject matter (Levy, 2008). Due to the lack of literature concerning the relationship between covert action and cultural intelligence, this case study design will establish and describe the relationship with the context of Operation JAWBREAKER. Case studies do more than regurgitate the happenings or events from a particular time and place. Applying this notion of case study research, this project will avoid the narrative form and instead will evaluate the case's characteristics that are relevant to the research question at hand. Within this case study structure, the author will utilize an illustrative case study in order to provide an applied example of the thesis' theoretical application (Levy, 2008 p.6).

Chapter 2 Summary

While extent literature provides a sound foundation on both cultural intelligence and covert action, there is a significant gap in the research literature attempting to establish the relationship between the two. Cultural intelligence as a multi-loci construct offers the theoretical foundation upon which to build this thesis. Through the descriptive case study design, this study will fill this current gap in the literature and establish a relationship between covert action and cultural intelligence, further providing a possible predictor of successful covert action operations, through the analysis of covert operatives cultural intelligence levels.

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the qualitative methodology used in this research, particularly describing the strengths of the case study approach examining the study's main thesis. Additionally, this chapter will present the study's research design, selection of cases, data collection and analysis procedures, and limitations of the research design. In particular, the chapter also will address issues concerning the study's credibility and transferability, the author's decision to analyze a single case, and will justify the selection of this particular case in detail. The author will then go into his process of both collecting and analyzing his data for this case study. The end of this chapter will present the strengths of the case study approach as a viable qualitative methodology for this particular topic and discuss any ethical issues that this research encountered.

Research Design

This research will be in the form of a descriptive cross-sectional research design, specifically an illustrative case-study approach. This design was selected in order to provide a foundation from which a more advanced and structured research study could be formulated (Levy, 2008) in the fields of covert action and cultural intelligence. A case study was the most relevant research design for this thesis in particular, due to the lack of research evaluating the relationship between covert action and cultural intelligence. Though there exists a substantial amount of literature regarding both covert action and cultural intelligence, the literature lacks a significant evaluation of the relationship between the two fields of study. The case study approach will be presented not in the

narrative form as a sequence of events, but rather as a collection of different aspects of the historical episode being evaluated in an effort to provide support to the theoretical framework being utilized, as well as to build on existent literature on the subject matter (Levy, 2008). Case studies do more than regurgitate the happenings or events from a particular time and place. Applying this notion of case study research, this project will avoid the narrative form and instead will evaluate the case's characteristics that are relevant to the research question at hand. Within this case study structure, the author will utilize an illustrative case study in order to provide an applied example of the thesis' theoretical application (Levy, 2008 p.6).

Case Selection

The JAWBREAKER campaign was selected as a single case study due to its tactical success and also relative importance given its recent nature. As defined previously, the author defines paramilitary operations as *operations carried out by forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission*. The CIA's JAWBREAKER teams provided equipment and training to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan following 9/11. Furthermore, these two forces shared a common mission of overthrowing the Taliban. While some may argue that the campaign was an overt paramilitary operation, the author defines JAWBREAKER as covert due to the fact that the US government maintained operational secrecy during the campaign to the point of concealing American involvement in the operation from the everyday Afghans themselves (Schoen, 2005). By selecting a successful paramilitary operation, the author is able to evaluate several, pertinent factors that contributed to its success. In this case, primarily, the CQ levels of

Gary Schroen and Gary Berntsen. Moreover, two factors contributed to the selection of JAWBREAKER rather than another successful covert action operation. First, September 11, 2001 sparked a monumental shift within the national security arena and its use of covert action to achieve its objectives. During the planning and implementation stages of Operation JAWBREAKER, the National Security Council or the President authorized CIA's team leaders to act as they saw fit throughout their operation without having to garner approval from individuals back in Langley or Washington (Woodward, 2002). This was unprecedented up to that point within the US national security sector. Secondly, the secret nature of covert operations, particularly in the recent history that is post-9/11, excludes a substantial amount of potential cases. It is important to note that the author is not describing the JAWBREAKER campaign as such a unique case to the degree that no other comparable cases exist. Rather, the classified nature of covert action operations—more specifically paramilitary operations—limits case availability for the purposes of this study. In short, the author was focused on choosing a paramilitary operation that took place following September 11th, and the JAWBREAKER campaign is the only significant and unclassified case within that time period.

The JAWBREAKER campaign also fits a number of characteristics that are imperative to a successful research design. Gerring (2001) outlined ten general criteria of successful research, a few of which apply to this case selection, notably boundness and representativeness. Boundness refers to the fact that Operation JAWBREAKER is relevant to the hypothesis being tested. The case is relevant to the degree that it fits the necessary criteria of a paramilitary operation where insight into the paramilitary officers' decision-making and thought process is available. Representativeness reflects the

comparability to the sample and the population (Gerring, 2001). Though the author admits that there is a limited number of cases available that fit the criteria of this study, he is making the assumption that the JAWBREAKER case is generalizable to the degree that other paramilitary operations in the post-9/11 American national security landscape share similar characteristics.

Data Collection

The study relied on a number of different memoirs and first-hand personal accounts by different individuals involved in Operation JAWBREAKER. These primary sources originate mainly from Gary Schroen and Gary Berntsen, who were paramilitary team leaders throughout the campaign; Hank Crumpton, the Deputy Director of the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center was JAWBREAKER teams' primary point of contact in Langley. Further secondary sources provided invaluable insight into the operation, notably Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward. These sources provided insight not only into the tactical operation, but also into the personal decision-making of the paramilitary officers on the ground for the duration of the campaign. The aforementioned secret nature of covert operations, particularly in the past 13 years following September 11th, 2001, limits the available information on this specific case.

Data Analysis Procedures

The study categorized the information from the previously mentioned primary and secondary sources into Ang et al.'s CQS. In each of Ang et al.'s 20 questions within their CQS, a rating system from 1-7 is provided. The author will draw from the experiences provided from these sources in an effort to categorize each of the individuals in question. To simplify this process, as well as reflect the fact that the author is restricted to primarily

independent sources that lack opportunities for verification or collaboration, the author will narrow the seven point scale down to a three point scale where:

- 1 = Disagree (inaccurate statement)
- 2 = Neutral (unclear or not accurate one way or another)
- 3 = Agree (accurate statement)

From these respective scores, the author will be able to determine which CQ dimension was most prominent in each of these two operatives, and attempt to draw the connection between their tactical and operational success and their CQ levels.

A second measure of data analysis will be in the form of a more “macro-level” approach. Following the evaluation of each covert operative within the context of the CQS, the author will present a whole-scale analysis of Operation JAWBREAKER as a whole. This will not only further investigate the use of cultural intelligence on the operation itself—as opposed to only the operatives—but will also provide further research to explore the success that Schroen and Berntsen collectively had throughout the Operation JAWBREAKER campaign.

Limitations of the Research Design

A number of limitations exist regarding the subject matter at hand. Due to the secret nature of covert action operations, there is limited literature regarding Operation JAWBREAKER and covert operations within Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001. Operation JAWBREAKER is unique in the fact that multiple memoirs and secondhand sources have been written on it. Memoirs are particularly vulnerable to bias, which the reader should keep in mind throughout this study. Furthermore, these documents highlight the identities of the covert operatives involved in the operation. It is certain that other covert operatives and operations have taken place

since September 2001 but remain classified. With this in mind, most literature comes from first-hand accounts through memoirs of operatives involved in the Operation JAWBREAKER campaign, though it is important to keep in mind that the CIA has vetted these primary sources prior to their publishing. Due to this study's reliance on these primary sources and memoirs, which possess limited independent verification, this research is likely to encounter bias. However, due to the fact that recent history has seen the Operation JAWBREAKER campaign as a resounding success, the author views these biases as negligible.

The author has chosen a narrow time frame for this research study. While Operation JAWBREAKER has no universally recognized time frame, the scope of this study runs from 26 September to 14 November 2001. These dates correspond to two important events, the insertion of the first JAWBREAKER team and the fall of the Afghan capital of Kabul. In sum, these critical events become the chronological "bookends" of this study. The fall of Kabul was a significant in that it meant, for all intents and purposes, the collapse of the Taliban government in Afghanistan (Crumpton, 2012). Furthermore, special operations forces played an increasingly prominent role in theater following these dates. While there was a special operations force presence during this study's designated time frame, the centerpieces of this time frame were indisputably the CIA's paramilitary teams.

Credibility

According to Trochim (2006), credibility in a qualitative research design refers to ensuring that the results of the study are believable from the perspective of the research participant. In this context, Schroen and Berntsen can play the role of research

participant. The author's utilization of these two individuals' firsthand accounts of the operation reflects the fact that this study's data and sources meet the requirement necessary to qualify as credible. Further secondary credible sources regarding the case itself, notably credible media sources and Bob Woodward's text, *Bush at War*, also add validity to the case study.

Transferability

Transferability refers to the findings of the study to be generalized to other circumstances, according to Trochim. The author's choice of Operation JAWBREAKER is transferable, most notably to covert operations more generally. The intent of this study is to understand the role of different cultural intelligence dimensions in paramilitary operatives in theater. As a paramilitary operation, JAWBREAKER was a covert operation, as defined by the author. Therefore, the inherent characteristics that paramilitary operations share with other covert action operations suggest that the study's findings are generalizable.

Ethical Issues

Due to the research design of this study, ethical issues in this study were generally negligible. The only potential ethical issue that the author would have possibly faced is the evaluation and discussion of information found in the secondary sources that may not have been vetted in order to omit any and all classified information. Bob Woodward's book specifically received criticism for potentially publishing classified information (Waas, 2006). However, due to the wide publication and popularity, the author has chosen to consider and utilize this source in the literature review.

Chapter 3 Summary

In this chapter the methodological framework of a qualitative illustrative case study was introduced and defended. Moreover, the selection of Operation JAWBREAKER as a single case was introduced, explained and defended. The research collection and analysis processes were presented through the introduction of the most notable primary and secondary sources as was the cultural intelligence scale that will be utilized in analyzing the data gathered from these sources. In the subsequent chapter the results of the study itself will be introduced. This will be the result of the information collected through the sources and the application of this research into Ang et al.'s CQS.

RESULTS

Introduction

This chapter will introduce the results of both this thesis by describing the illustrative case study findings as well as the survey findings that were applied to both of the JAWBREAKER team leaders. The case study results will be introduced in general terms dealing with the partnership of the JAWBREAKER teams and the Afghan leaders during the campaign. After laying the foundation in an effort to emphasize the importance of effective cross-cultural relationships within Operation JAWBREAKER, Ang et al.'s CQS will be applied to both Gary Schroen and Gary Berntsen. The author will draw from primary and secondary sources in order to score these two individuals on the criteria provided by Ang et al. (2007). In doing so, the author will provide tables of the survey portion being evaluated at that time which justify the respective score for each individual.

Subsequently, the author will present an overall evaluation of Operation JAWBREAKER to better reflect the effectiveness of the campaign as a whole. Through this, the reader will better understand the impact that the covert operatives had on the mission and overall strategic goals of a post-9/11 American foreign policy and national security environment. At the end of this chapter the reader will have a robust understanding of the application of cultural intelligence to both Gary Schroen and Gary Berntsen. Furthermore, the reader will comprehend the astounding success of the operation and the critical role that cultural intelligence played not only on the tactical level through Schroen and Berntsen, but also on the operational level through the implementation of the mission.

Data and Analysis

Cultural Intelligence in Operation JAWBREAKER

Following the attacks on September 11th, the CIA understood that it would need to utilize alliances with Afghan militias, warlords, tribal leaders, and the Northern Alliance, a loosely formed military alliance of primarily ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks in order to combat the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan (Crumpton, 2012). With this diverse network of Afghans, Operation JAWBREAKER team leads needed to capitalize on their cultural intelligence in order to establish working relationships across cultures and unify them towards a common goal. Since Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the Northern Alliance had been in opposition to the ruling Taliban and controlled the northeast region of Afghanistan making them attractive allies in the eyes of Washington (Woodward, 2002). At the time, the CIA had limited personnel with the necessary skills to spearhead a covert action campaign in Afghanistan (Crumpton, 2012). These desired skills included the understanding of Afghan languages, such as Pashtun and Dari, and an understanding of terrain (Crumpton, 2012). The simple answer to these problems was the employment of Afghans themselves alongside CIA paramilitary operatives from the CIA. Coupled with the aforementioned skills, as well as an understanding of the enemy and powerful warrior ethos, many Afghans shared a mutual interest with Americans—a hatred of al Qaeda (Crumpton, 2012). Two individuals who fit the profile the CIA was looking for were Gary Schroen and Gary Berntsen of the CIA's Directorate of Operations. They were tasked to lead the JAWBREAKER operations in order to carry out the mission of eliminating the safe haven the Taliban was providing to al Qaeda.

Critical to the success of Schroen and Berntsen was the relationship they were able to establish with the Afghan warlords who were not aligned with the Taliban. Because the Northern Alliance was the most effective fighting force in Afghanistan capable of combating the Taliban and al Qaeda, the American strategy quickly formulated upon a quick defeat of the Taliban through American bombing of their front lines and an unleashed Northern Alliance on the ground (Schroen, 2005). Through the use of Northern Alliance equipment, personnel, and resources, the US government and CIA simply had to provide leadership, guidance, and general support to the operations (Schroen, 2005). The role of Afghans themselves working in conjunction with the CIA and special operations forces is perhaps best exemplified when it is pointed out that from the insertion of the first JAWBREAKER team to the fall of Kabul, only 110 CIA operatives and 300 special operations forces were on the ground (Crumpton, 2012). The CIA's initial plan of using independent networked teams of operations officers and special forces operatives in conjunction with a main contingent of Afghan militias had been successful (Crumpton, 2012).

Gary Schroen's initial JAWBREAKER team had the mission of meeting up with the Northern Alliance in the Panshir Valley and convincing its leaders to fully cooperate with the CIA and US government in pursuit of al Qaeda, UBL, and the Taliban (Schroen, 2005). This was made much easier due to the fact that Schroen had a decades-old rapport with Northern Alliance commanders dating back to the Soviet invasion in the 1980s (Coll, 2004). Furthermore, Schroen and Operation JAWBREAKER evaluated the Northern Alliance's military capabilities and work to convince its leaders to accept US

forces into the Panshir Valley and join the effort to overthrow the Taliban and expel al Qaeda from Afghanistan (Schroen, 2005).

Gary Schroen CQS

The mission of the initial JAWBREAKER team lead by Gary Schroen was not combat but rather intelligence collection and covert action leadership of the Afghans (Crumpton, 2012). Fortunately, Schroen was able to utilize his high CQ in order to engage and maintain a working relationship with the US's Afghan allies (Crumpton, 2012).

Table 4.1: Gary Schroen Metacognitive CQ Score

| CQ-Strategy | Trait | Score |
|--------------------|--|--------------|
| MC1 | Individual is conscious of the cultural knowledge he uses when interacting with people with different cultural backgrounds | 3 |
| MC2 | Individual adjusts his cultural knowledge as he interact with people from a culture that is unfamiliar to him | 3 |
| MC3 | Individual is conscious of the cultural knowledge he applies to cross-cultural interactions | 3 |
| MC4 | Individual checks the accuracy of his cultural knowledge as he interacts with people from different cultures | 3 |

Source: Buckley, 2014

At the time of Gary Schroen's selection as Operation JAWBREAKER team leader, he had over 30 years of operational experience abroad (Woodward, 2002). More specifically, Schroen had spent the 1970s in both Tehran and Islamabad, and by the 1980s rose to the position of Chief of Station for the CIA's Dubai and Kabul stations, the latter of which he oversaw from Islamabad. Throughout the 1990s leading up to 9/11 Schroen served as the Deputy Chief of Station in Saudi Arabia, and Chief of Station at an undisclosed station tasked with activities directed against the Iranian government. From

1996-1999 Schroen served as Chief of Station in Islamabad and subsequently Deputy Chief of Near East and Southeast Asia Division for the CIA at headquarters (Woodward, 2002). Throughout this career Schroen was able to establish and maintain an effective relationship with Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud through financing his efforts against the Taliban and, prior to that, combat the invading Soviet Union in the 1980s (Coll, 2004).

This extensive operational experience that is characterized by a prolonged and deep immersion of cultures vastly different than his own and furthered by the exemplified a long career Schroen had been able to amass over those three decades reflects an exemplary metacognitive (MC) cultural intelligence capacity, as qualified by Ang et al.'s (2007) CQS. To reflect this, a score of three, representing a positive relationship between the subject and the trait is attributed to Gary Schroen for each of the four metacognitive factors.

Table 4.2: Gary Schroen Cognitive CQ Score

| CQ-Knowledge | Trait | Score |
|---------------------|--|--------------|
| COG1 | Individual knows the legal and economic systems of other cultures | 3 |
| COG2 | Individuals knows the rules of other languages | 3 |
| COG3 | Individual knows the cultural values and religious beliefs of other cultures | 3 |
| COG4 | Individual knows the marriage systems of other cultures | 3 |
| COG5 | Individual knows the arts and crafts of other cultures | 3 |
| COG6 | Individual knows the rules for expressing non-verbal behaviors in other cultures | 3 |

Source: Buckley, 2014.

A number of critical factors impacted the scoring of all three regarding Schroen's cognitive CQ. His aforementioned operational experience in Central Asia as well as his

relationships with Afghan leaders prior to his involvement in Operation JAWBREAKER, notably with Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, suggests a virtual certainty that Schroen was extraordinarily knowledgeable about Afghan culture as a whole, as well as the various tribal factions within Afghanistan. Schroen maintained an effective relationship with Massoud dating back to the Mujahidin in the 1980s. Schroen financed Massoud's efforts against the Soviet Union and later the Taliban (Coll, 2004). This relationship with Massoud played a critical role in Schroen establishing a relationship of trust with potential allies in a short amount of time, critical to achieving the American objective of overthrowing the Taliban in a rapid fashion following 9/11. A victim of a suicide bombing on 10 September 2001, Massoud was the primary leader in the Afghan opposition to the Taliban (Woodward, 2002). The relationship between Massoud and Schroen would have been difficult had Schroen not had the cultural cognizance of Afghanistan and the various tribal factions within the country. Furthermore, Schroen was a fluent speaker of Pashto and Dari (Woodward, 2002). This language ability, previous experience within Afghanistan and the surrounding region, as well as previously established relationships with Afghan leaders suggest that each of Ang et al.'s (2007) six cognitive (COG) factors can be positively applied to Schroen.

Table 4.3: Gary Schroen Motivational CQ Score

| CQ-Motivation | Trait | Score |
|----------------------|--|--------------|
| MOT1 | Individual enjoys interacting with people from different cultures | 3 |
| MOT2 | Individual is confident that he can socialize with locals in a culture that is unfamiliar to him | 3 |
| MOT3 | Individual is sure he can deal with the stresses of adjusting to a culture that is new to him | 3 |
| MOT4 | Individual enjoys living in cultures that are unfamiliar to him | 3 |
| MOT5 | Individual is confident that he can get used to shopping conditions in a different culture | 3 |

Source: Buckley, 2014

Gary Schroen scores remarkably well in the motivational (MOT) aspect of CQ, according to Ang et al.'s (2007) CQS. His aforementioned extensive international career points towards favorable scores for each of Ang et al.'s (2007) CQ-Motivation traits.

In the 1990s, Schroen met with Massoud to plan against the Taliban and attempt to collect Stinger missiles the US provided Afghan warlords during the Soviet invasion a decade prior. Afghan leaders welcomed Schroen's visit due to the fact that, in the eyes of Afghans, few Americans took the trouble to visit Afghanistan. Moreover even fewer Americans had the cultural expertise and language ability effectively engage and interact with the Afghans (Coll, 2004).

Despite this extensive experience, it should be mentioned that Schroen was not entirely proficient in Afghan culture upon deployment during Operation JAWBREAKER. Schroen marveled at the interconnectedness of Afghan culture, regardless of conflict between individuals or groups, something he had not previously been aware of (Schroen, 2005). Schroen noticed that many Afghan troops aligned with the United States had contact with Taliban forces or civilians inside enemy lines

(Schroen, 2005). Moreover, Schroen recognized that money was the driving force behind many successful relationships in Afghanistan (Schroen, 2005). Almost upon arrival in Afghanistan, Gary Schroen and Operation JAWBREAKER were, quite literally, invested in the Northern Alliance and willing Afghan partners. Schroen touched down in Afghanistan carrying \$3 million in US currency for recruitment of potential Afghan allies (Woodward, 2002). This money was not only meant as a sign of goodwill, but also meant to help Afghan allies feed, arm, and build up their forces in anticipation of conflict with the Taliban and al Qaeda. This exposure to previously unknown cultural characteristics of Afghans, and even more importantly the wherewithal to use it to the mission's benefit display Schroen's outstanding motivational CQ level.

Table 4.4: Gary Schroen Behavioral CQ Score

| CQ-Behavior | Trait | Score |
|--------------------|---|--------------|
| BEH1 | Individual changes his verbal behavior when a cross-cultural interaction requires it | 3 |
| BEH2 | Individual uses pause and silence differently to suit different cross-cultural situations | 3 |
| BEH3 | Individual varies the rate of his speaking when a cross-cultural situation requires it | 3 |
| BEH4 | Individual changes his non-verbal behavior when a cross-cultural situation requires it | 3 |
| BEH5 | Individual alters his facial expressions when a cross-cultural interaction requires it | 2 |

Source: Buckley, 2014

Gary Schroen exemplifies a paramilitary officer with a very high behavioral (BEH) CQ level, according to the ratings assigned in Ang et al.'s (2007) CQS. The same traits that scored Schroen high marks on metacognitive, cognitive, and motivational CQ can be applied to behavioral CQ. Specifically, due to the fact that much of the behavioral CQ traits are based around communication, Schroen's fluency in Dari and Pashtu are incredibly important in evaluating him against these traits. The effective relationships

Schroen was able to build with Afghan leaders are also telling when it comes to the accuracy of these statements as applied to Schroen.

Gary Berntsen CQS

The mission of the JAWBREAKER team lead by Gary Berntsen was more combat-oriented than Gary Schroen (Crumpton, 2012). Berntsen was tasked with utilizing the intelligence and logistics apparatus laid out by Schroen in eliminating the Taliban and al Qaeda through the managing of Afghan forces. Exceptionally successful, Berntsen was able to oversee the removal of the Taliban from the capital city of Kabul by mid-November, 2001 (Berntsen, 2012).

Table 4.5: Gary Berntsen Metacognitive CQ Score

| CQ-Strategy | Trait | Score |
|--------------------|--|--------------|
| MC1 | Individual is conscious of the cultural knowledge he uses when interacting with people with different cultural backgrounds | 3 |
| MC2 | Individual adjusts his cultural knowledge as he interacts with people from a culture that is unfamiliar to him | 3 |
| MC3 | Individual is conscious of the cultural knowledge he applies to cross-cultural interactions | 3 |
| MC4 | Individual checks the accuracy of his cultural knowledge as he interacts with people from different cultures | 3 |

Source: Buckley, 2014

Gary Berntsen spent 23 years as a covert operative and instructor during his career at the CIA. This 23-year tenure included 17 years in the CIA's Near East/South Asia division focusing on that area of the world, to include the Persian Gulf and a two-year stint as an operations leader against Hezbollah (Berntsen, 2005). With this in mind, the author came to the conclusion that Berntsen's decorated career is reflective of his metacognitive ability (MC) to succeed in the numerous postings he experienced up to his

deployment to Afghanistan as a part of Operation JAWBREAKER. Each of the four MC traits Ang et al. (2007) outlined can be positively applied to Gary Berntsen.

Table 4.6: Gary Berntsen Cognitive CQ Score

| CQ- Knowledge | Trait | Score |
|--------------------------|--|--------------|
| COG1 | Individual knows the legal and economic systems of other cultures | 3 |
| COG2 | Individual knows the rules of other languages | 3 |
| COG3 | Individual knows the cultural values and religious beliefs of other cultures | 3 |
| COG4 | Individual knows the marriage systems of other cultures | 3 |
| COG5 | Individual knows the arts and crafts of other cultures | 3 |
| COG6 | Individual knows the rules for expressing non-verbal behaviors in other cultures | 3 |

Source: Buckley, 2014

Gary Berntsen's fluency in Farsi, and Dari coupled by his professional experience throughout the Middle East and Central Asia represent high cultural intelligence cognition (COG) (Crumpton, 2012). A reasonable conclusion can be drawn that a covert operative such as Berntsen would never have remained abroad for the extensive duration of his career had he not showcased, at the very least, a high level of COG abilities that Ang et al. (2007) outlined.

Table 4.7: Gary Berntsen Motivational CQ Score

| CQ-Motivation | Trait | Score |
|----------------------|--|--------------|
| MOT1 | Individual enjoys interacting with people from different cultures | 3 |
| MOT2 | Individual is confident that he can socialize with locals in a culture that is unfamiliar to him | 3 |
| MOT3 | Individual is sure he can deal with the stresses of adjusting to a culture that is new to him | 3 |
| MOT4 | Individual enjoys living in cultures that are unfamiliar to him | 3 |
| MOT5 | Individual is confident that he can get used to shopping conditions in a different culture | 3 |

Source: Buckley, 2014

Gary Berntsen's high CQ motivation level (MOT) is reflective of his long, illustrious, and diverse career as a member of the CIA. Similar to his high COG marks, it is almost certain that Berntsen would never have enjoyed such a decorated and successful career had he not possessed the motivational dimension of cultural intelligence Ang et al. (2007) outline. Moreover, by their very nature covert operations demand an element of secrecy. A covert operative such as Berntsen would need to abide by all of the MOT traits Ang et al. present in order to be an effective covert operative and maintain the necessary level of discreteness.

Table 4.8: Gary Berntsen Behavioral CQ Score

| CQ-Behavior | Trait | Score |
|--------------------|---|--------------|
| BEH1 | Individual changes his verbal behavior when a cross-cultural interaction requires it | 2 |
| BEH2 | Individual uses pause and silence differently to suit different cross-cultural situations | 3 |
| BEH3 | Individual varies the rate of his speaking when a cross-cultural situation requires it | 3 |
| BEH4 | Individual changes his non-verbal behavior when a cross-cultural situation requires it | 2 |
| BEH5 | Individual alters his facial expressions when a cross-cultural interaction requires it | 2 |

Source: Buckley, 2014

Berntsen scores moderately in his behavioral (BEH) CQ dimension, per Ang et al.'s (2007) CQS. High scores are administered in language-based traits, such as BEH2 and BEH3, due to Berntsen's proficiency in Farsi and Dari. However, Berntsen's personality is seemingly one that lacks tact. Examples of this that justify these moderate ratings in BEH1, BEH4, and BEH5 include Berntsen's (2005) self-described tendency to take a "grab-them-by-the-neck" approach when dealing with HUMINT sources (p. 45). While elements of this admittedly vague characterization cannot justify a complete reduction in score down to 1, the author settles with a moderate score of 2 in order to reflect what seems to be a bull-headed personality that does not entirely reflect these specified traits. His former boss, Hank Crumpton, described Berntsen's attitude as "unconventional, sometimes ruthless" (Crumpton, 2012, p. 198).

Further support for this conclusion can be drawn from Berntsen's interaction with the Military Chief of the Northern Alliance, General Mohammed Qasim Fahim. When meeting with General Fahim to negotiate the use of his 15,000 troops to combat the Taliban, Fahim's demand for substantial monthly payment sparked a stark rebuke from Berntsen, who received looks of horror "because of the hostile tone [he] had used to address the Military Chief of the Northern Alliance" (Berntsen, 2005, p.92). This is just one example of Berntsen's tendency not to mince words, regardless of the cultural context or presence of cross-cultural interaction.

Operation JAWBREAKER and Cultural Intelligence

The lack of precedence of a covert operation of this scale and nature forced the JAWBREAKER teams to have an immediate sense of reliance on the Northern Alliance upon the beginning of the operation in late September 2001 (Schroen, 2005). Ultimately,

this dependency on the Northern Alliance proved beneficial for all involved. The CIA wanted to work with the Northern Alliance in mapping potential airstrikes against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, while the Northern Alliance recognized that US airstrikes provided an incalculable tactical advantage in the Northern Alliance's fight against the Taliban (Schroen, 2005). Northern Alliance commanders possessed a battlefield awareness that the CIA could not come close to matching due to over 20 year combat experiences in Afghanistan (Schroen, 2005). This knowledge provided an intimate understanding of Taliban positions, capabilities, and even distinction of enemy forces (Schroen, 2005). By pairing Farsi-speaking case officers with these seasoned Afghan commanders, JAWBREAKER planners were able to help facilitate intelligence sharing with US air power within the battlespace, decimating enemy strongholds in the early stages of the campaign (Berntsen, 2012). In addition to the understanding of the terrain and enemy disposition, the Afghans were critical allies due to their ability to recruit other Afghans to join the CIA, ability to penetrate the Taliban due to the interconnectedness of Afghan society, and the tactical ability to move their troops immediately and effectively (Crumpton, 2012). These were all skills that the CIA lacked in its personnel, and these were also all skills that were paramount to Operation JAWBREAKER's mission success—the Afghans themselves were the only answer (Crumpton, 2012). This bilateral relationship is an ideal case of understanding the value of culture in the battlefield. Without the ability to effectively communicate and willingness to rely on the Northern Alliance for critical battlefield intelligence and background, the JAWBREAKER campaign would never have been able to achieve such a rapid overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Even this mutually beneficial relationship was not without cultural differences, however. For example, due the tribal rifts within Afghanistan, some Northern Alliance leaders, while welcoming of the US forces, were nervous how other Afghan warlords would react to Americans in Afghanistan (Schroen, 2005). The United States also had no reservations about working alongside Afghan warlords regardless of their ethnic, religious, or tribal ties—a traditionally contentious issue in Afghanistan. Some allies even operated semi-autonomously from Northern Alliance leadership (Schroen, 2005). In addition, the US would not allow Northern Alliance commanders to dictate where they deployed their forces (Schroen, 2005). This cultural issue was further exacerbated when considered that, in the eyes of US senior policymakers, the Northern Alliance commanders' seemingly trite issues of pride were simply a lack of focus and sense of seriousness regarding the operation (Schroen, 2005). This can be further interpreted as an American lack of cultural intelligence and understanding of the Northern Alliance critical issues and tribal ties and networks. Further seemingly trivial issues to American leaders were critical in the eyes of the Afghans, such as American dress. Multiple Northern Alliance leaders objected to CIA and other American forces wearing anything other than traditional Afghan garb while in country (Schroen, 2005). Additionally, Northern Alliance leaders initially wanted to reject the special operations forces tasked with training their troops because they held their fighting capabilities and warrior ethos in such high regard that they did not need instruction or guidance (Schroen, 2005).

Eventually, these cultural differences between the US and the Afghans were set aside due to reciprocal need to work in coordination against the Taliban. According to Schroen (2005), “effective airstrikes proved to be more important to Northern Alliance

leadership than the dress of the [American] teams,” (p. 219). Northern Alliance commanders even went so far as to admit that Northern Alliance casualties from US airstrikes could be tolerated as long as the enemy was being decimated (Schroen, 2005). Ill-equipped in terms of raw kinetic firepower, the Northern Alliance was in desperate need of US material support; after combatting the Taliban for years, Northern Alliance leaders were not about to squander the chance to overthrow the Taliban over political ambitions or tribal factions (Crumpton, 2012). It was clear in the eyes of JAWBREAKER command that the most important factor in the CIA/Northern Alliance relationship was the destruction of the Taliban.

In dealing with the tribal factions of Afghanistan, it was necessary for the United States to empower a leader who could effectively serve as an Afghan unifier. A critical example of American understanding of Afghan culture was the recognition and pursuit of Hamid Karzai as this unifier. In order to succeed in bringing the Pashtun-dominated south into a post-Taliban government, the United States needed to create an armed resistance in the south (Crumpton, 2012). Karzai was not only the critical Pashtun leader in Afghanistan, but he also embraced the concept of a national Afghan identity (Crumpton, 2012). The US understood that Karzai had the motivation to combat due to the fact that they assassinated his father in 1999 and understood to opportunity to gain power through working alongside the US to overthrow the Taliban. Perhaps even more significant than Karzai’s willingness to join the American cause against the Taliban is that Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Hazara all agreed that Karzai was the only political figure that could unify Pashtun and non-Pashtun sects of the country (Crumpton, 2012). The US needed Karzai to rally Pashtun warlords against the Taliban, and did so by capitalizing on

Afghan warrior culture. Gary Berntsen sent a JAWBREAKER team member into southern Afghanistan to pitch the cause to Karzai and his fellow Pashtun tribesmen. Berntsen's man spoke to the Pashtun and general Afghan warrior ethos by reminding them of Taliban murders against other Afghan leaders such as Masood Shah Massod and Abdul Haq, a Pashtun leader the Taliban captured and murdered in October 2001. These Pashtun tribesmen were honor bound to seek revenge against the Taliban's reign of murder and repression, according to the JAWBREAKER team member who spoke to the *Jirga* (Crumpton, 2012). The JAWBREAKER team's successful solicitation of Pashtun allegiance solidified the only chance for a unified, centralized, Karzai-led Afghan government.

In one instance where the United States displayed a poor manifestation of cultural intelligence was dealing with taking the Afghan capital of Kabul. Policy makers could not agree on whether or not to allow the Northern Alliance to take Kabul (Schroen, 2005). In doing so, the US and by extension JAWBREAKER failed to account for the power vacuum within the city itself. Despite US concerns that ethnic Tajiks would enter the city and incite a massacre of Pashtuns that had previously supported the Taliban regime, sooner or later, the lack of a power base within the city made it only a matter of time before the city fell to the Northern Alliance (Schroen, 2005). Furthermore, the United States did not recognize the ethnic and historical significance that the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance held for Kabul (Schroen, 2005). This entire strategy was a miscalculation and misinterpretation of Afghan culture in the form of ignoring the psychological importance of Kabul to the Northern Alliance. Northern Alliance capture of Kabul validated an era of Afghan struggle under the Taliban rule (Schroen, 2005). In

fact, the Northern Alliance was fully invested in moving on Kabul in the winter of 2001 regardless of Washington's approval (Schroen, 2005). This was despite the fact that the United States had ordered the Northern Alliance to halt outside of city limits and allow United Nations (UN) peacekeepers to enter the city and secure it first (Berntsen, 2012). In the end, Pashtun leader Hamid Karzai assumed the Presidency and Washington's human rights concerns proved for naught.

From 7-10 October, through close cooperation and coordination between the Northern Alliance/Afghan allies and the United States, US air power had struck and destroyed almost all of the al Qaeda/Taliban fixed targets in Afghanistan. Throughout this span, Afghan intelligence networks' and unilateral Afghan agents' efforts were most critical (Crumpton, 2012). This relationship was based upon key leaders such as Gary Schroen, Gary Berntsen, and senior CIA officials sitting down and establishing a rapport with the Afghans. This rapport and relationship building proved critical to the JAWBREAKER campaign.

Chapter 4 Summary

Both Gary Schroen and Gary Berntsen possessed high CQ levels across all dimensions Ang et al. (2007) highlighted in their CQS. Both were highly decorated covert operatives with long careers abroad in many different cultures than American or Western. These extensive professional experiences no doubt contributed to the high CQ levels displayed in each of the two individuals. The metacognitive, cognitive, motivational, and behavioral CQ traits were virtually all explicitly present in both operatives. In the following chapter the author will draw conclusions from these

findings, and examine how they relate to Ang et al.'s (2007) previous findings regarding their CQS.

CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

This chapter will summarize this thesis. It will begin by presenting a summary of the study in an effort to refresh the reader's mind regarding the nature, purpose, and methodologies utilized throughout the study. Next, this chapter will discuss the findings of the thesis as they pertain to the study's extant literature. This chapter will then address both the practical implications of this study and recommendations for further research before concluding with the important aspects of the study as a whole. At the end of this chapter the reader will have a complete and cumulative understanding of the study.

Summary of the Study

The purpose of this study was to understand the correlation between cultural intelligence dimensions and covert action operations, within the context of covert operatives' cultural intelligence levels. As a qualitative study, this thesis utilized the case study approach, specifically Operation JAWBREAKER, the CIA's paramilitary operation in Afghanistan following 9/11. By evaluating the sequence of events on the ground during Operation JAWBREAKER, the author established a thorough understanding of the two key paramilitary leaders. Taking these traits and applying them to Ang et al.'s 20 question CQS, the author was able to evaluate the actions of the two individuals throughout their experience as a part of the Operation JAWBREAKER campaign in an effort to understand their cultural intelligence levels and the impact they had on their actions in Afghanistan. The results of this study clearly demonstrated remarkably high cultural intelligence levels in both Schroen and Berntsen.

Discussion of the Findings

The high CQ levels in both Schroen and Berntsen support Ang et al.'s (2007) conclusion that there exists a “systemic pattern of relationships between dimensions of CQ and specific intercultural effectiveness outcomes” (p. 362). Both Operation JAWBREAKER team leaders possessed high CQ scores in the four CQ dimensions, suggesting that Ang et al.'s conclusions can be applied to the unique cross-cultural interaction that is covert action, specifically paramilitary action.

Gary Schroen scored perfect across all four cultural dimensions within the constructs of Operation JAWBREAKER. This provides support to the application of Ang et al.'s (2007) conclusions to paramilitary operations. Specifically, Ang et al. found that MC and COG will relate positively to cultural judgment and decision-making. Schroen's remarkably high scores in both of these cultural dimensions, coupled with his success on the ground in Operation JAWBREAKER, suggest that this finding can likely be applied to paramilitary operatives. Ang et al.'s second finding regarding their CQS was that MOT and BEH relate positively to cultural adaptation. Again, Schroen's perfect scores imply that this finding can also be applied to paramilitary operations, given Schroen's success in Afghanistan. Lastly, Ang et al. found that MC and BEH CQ maintain a positive relationship with task performance in a cross-cultural interaction. Similarly, Schroen's high marks in both of these dimensions add support to these conclusions. Though the fact that correlation does not equal causation must be kept in mind when interpreting these results, Schroen's almost perfect scores across the board in each CQ dimensions offer support to Ang et al.'s conclusions when applied to paramilitary operatives.

Gary Berntsen also scored remarkably high across each of the four CQ dimensions. Berntsen's perfect marks in MC and COG offer similar conclusions to that of Gary Schroen. Berntsen's MC and COG levels imply that he possesses effective cultural judgment and decision-making, something that is obviously important to paramilitary operations as a cross-cultural interaction. Ang et al.'s second conclusion of MOT and BEH as reflective of cultural adaptation is not necessarily reflective of Gary Berntsen, due to his relatively mediocre scores in the CQ BEH dimension. This could mean one of two things when it comes to the application of CQ to paramilitary operatives. Firstly, it could suggest that Ang et al.'s finding is not applicable to this case in that behavior is not as indicative of cultural adaptation in paramilitary actions. Secondly, Berntsen's average scores in BEH CQ could suggest that cultural adaptation is not as important to paramilitary operations as it is to other cross-cultural interactions. The latter is more likely to be the case, however, as it would be difficult to make a strong argument that behavior is not reflective of cultural adaptation in any sort of cross-cultural interaction, to include paramilitary operations. The more likely scenario is that cultural adaptation is not as important in paramilitary operations as it may be in other cross-cultural interactions. The mutually beneficial relationship of paramilitary operations in such a perilous situation could offset minor behavioral traits that the operative may lack. This is not to say, however, that the behavioral dimension of CQ is not important to paramilitary operatives' operational success. Gary Berntsen possessed the other cultural dimensions to their fullest extent, but when it came to behavioral CQ he was not afraid to do whatever was necessary to ensure mission accomplishment. This conscious decision to sacrifice minor behavioral norms is the driving force behind his mediocre scores. Regardless, it is

clear through Berntsen's successful continuation of Operation JAWBREAKER, culminating with the fall of Kabul on 14 November 2001, that these average BEH scores were not inhibitive of his operational success.

Schroen and Berntsen's high scores reflect, at the very least, a positive correlation between high CQ and operation success during paramilitary operations. With this in mind, the primary finding of this research is that cultural intelligence is highly likely to play a strong role in a paramilitary operative's operational success.

Implications for Practice

Simply put, high levels of CQ across all four dimensions should be mandatory when selecting paramilitary team leaders for specific missions. This includes working knowledge of local language and customs, as well as extensive operational experience in the specific AOR, similar to Schroen and Berntsen's profiles. While some of cultural intelligence dimensions can be encouraged through training, others are inherent in an individual. It is important to find an appropriate balance of valuable inherited traits and valuable learning traits. For example, critical skills such as foreign language ability or AOR expertise can be developed over a certain period of time to help prepare an individual as completely as possible to be placed in a cross-cultural setting. Furthermore, it is important to note that operatives such as Schroen and Berntsen had many years of experience and training that helped them to hone their learned traits. These learned traits, which can be applied to all four CQ dimensions, were built over a lengthy period of time, showing that high CQ is partly a product of culturally diverse experience.

These learned traits are incredibly valuable and necessary to a covert operative, but they are not the whole picture. Inherited traits such as cultural sensitivity and

curiosity are also critical to a high CQ level. In short, individuals need to have a natural personality that highlights the metacognitive, cognitive, motivational, and behavioral dimensions of CQ. Without these inherent traits, learned skills such as foreign language ability and experience abroad are irrelevant. While inherent traits can impact all four CQ dimensions in both positive and negative ways, motivation has the most direct relationship to inherent traits. Covert operatives need to possess a high CQ not only in their experiences and on their resumes, but also in their personalities in order to maximize their CQ and experience as much success as possible as covert operatives.

Policy makers, specifically the President, are confronted with threats that can be effectively combated through the use of covert action, to include paramilitary operations, correct leadership assignments must be administered. By having a comprehensive understanding of the role that a high CQ can play during covert action operations, policymakers and leaders tasked with assigning command of these missions must not undervalue high CQ. Furthermore, these leaders should conduct an all-inclusive evaluation of an individual's CQ prior to assigning him to a leadership role in a paramilitary operation. This is to say that not too much emphasis should be placed on one aspect over another such as emphasizing a need for foreign language fluency and downplaying the importance of the motivational dimension of cultural intelligence. All four dimensions and their subsets provide a balanced foundation of success. The inappropriate emphasis on one trait or dimension resulting in the undervaluing of another could be a critical mistake when planning and implementing paramilitary operations.

Recommendations for Further Research

In all, Schroen and Berntsen's cultural intelligence levels were exceptionally high. This provides positive insight into the operatives' success of Operation JAWBREAKER as a paramilitary operation, but its implications are far from conclusive. While the evidence supports the notion that Ang et al.'s CQS findings can be applied to paramilitary operatives, the central research question of this research project was to determine which cultural intelligence dimension, when evaluated through covert operatives, is the most critical to operational success of covert paramilitary operations. Due to the success of Schroen and Berntsen, as well as their aforementioned high scores all across the CQS, further research is needed to better answer this research question.

In the instance where a researcher replicates this study's methodology in the form of new case studies, the author suggests weighting some of the cultural intelligence dimension scores. For instance, shopping conditions in a different culture (see MOT5) is likely less critical to measuring cultural intelligence in covert operatives than the stresses that come with working in a new cross-cultural environment (MOT3). Further research would benefit from differentiating criteria that may not be as applicable to covert operatives.

Further insightful research would evaluate the fit of culturally intelligent operatives into the US's primary covert action agency, the Central Intelligence Agency. Organizational theory is critical to ensuring the success of its employees, particularly in a situation as critical as covert action and paramilitary operations. As Earley and Ang (2007) point out, different types of organizations warrant varying types of individuals. Organizations with mercenary culture, such as the CIA's SAD for instance, "benefit from

a clear understanding of purpose and the ability to mobilize resources swiftly in order to achieve ends” (Earley and Ang, 2007, p. 248). With this in mind, individuals with the necessary cultural intelligence skills to effectively engage in cross-cultural interactions are critical to mission success. Evaluating the relationship between the CIA, and this “mercenary culture,” and the type of individuals it employs in the SAD would help further the literature on the effectiveness of covert action and paramilitary operatives. In furthering this research, it would be beneficial to recognize what type of organization the subjects are a part of and which cultural intelligence dimensions are most important given the subject’s organizational construct.

Conclusions

The research conducted in this thesis revealed strong support for the case of cultural intelligence as a multi-locus construct. More importantly, it established the foundation of evaluating the relationship between covert action and cultural intelligence. This research was able to highlight the strong correlation between high CQ in paramilitary operatives and paramilitary success in the field. The critical need for cultural intelligence in the midst of paramilitary operatives, as demonstrated through this thesis, is a topic that has not received any academic consideration or research. It is difficult considering the classified nature of covert action operations, as well as the relatively newfound field of study that is cultural intelligence. However, in a dynamic national security environment with an increasing emphasis on unconventional foreign policy instruments, such as covert action operations, the need to understand critical factors of success of these operations has never been more important.

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